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INTRODUCTION 
Debates about rent regulation are not known for their nuance.  
The world tends to divide into fierce opponents and strong 
supporters.  But within these debates, stakeholders and 
commentators rarely engage with the details of local ordinances, even 
though those details may significantly affect outcomes for tenants, 
landlords, and broader housing markets.  This Article expands the 
landscape of contemporary rent regulation debates by articulating 
and cataloging the numerous choices jurisdictions must make in 
designing and implementing rent regulation programs.  It shows that, 
far from being monolithic, rent regulation programs comprise a range 
of diverse schemes. The dearth of research examining the details of 
these schemes, however, has hindered policymakers from 
understanding their available choices and the trade-offs among them. 
Part I of this Article reviews the overarching goals of rent 
regulation and explains how some of these goals may be in tension 
with each other.  Parts II through IV outline the choices that local 
policymakers must make in enacting and implementing rent 
regulation ordinances and highlight the wide variety of regimes that 
jurisdictions with rent regulation have adopted in practice.  Part II 
illustrates the choices that define the basic features of rent regulation: 
which units are to be regulated, how they become deregulated, and 
how jurisdictions implement and oversee these processes.  Part III 
tackles the many components of annual rent increases, from how 
jurisdictions set annual, across-the-board increases to the exceptions 
and adjustments that may arise in cases of vacancy, building or unit 
improvements, or hardship.  Part IV examines the ways in which rent 
regulation schemes interact with other tenant protections, chiefly 
safeguards against harassment and eviction, as well as protections for 
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vulnerable groups.  Part V calls for new empirical research to study 
the effects of different regulatory features. 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE GOALS OF RENT REGULATION 
A. Stated Goals of Rent Regulation Programs 
State and local governments have authorized or adopted rent 
regulations to serve a number of different goals.  One objective of 
rent regulation is to protect existing tenants from rent increases that 
would make their housing unaffordable.  New York City puts that 
goal most starkly, justifying its program as necessary to “prevent 
exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental 
agreements and to forestall profiteering, speculation and other 
disruptive practices tending to produce threats to the public health, 
safety and general welfare.”1  Similarly, Oakland, California states its 
purposes is to “provid[e] relief to residential tenants in Oakland by 
limiting rent increases for existing tenants.”2  Washington, D.C. lists 
“protect[ing] low- and moderate-income tenants from the erosion of 
their income from increased housing costs” as the first of its five 
objectives.3  D.C. is unusual in specifying that its goal is to protect 
tenants with low and moderate incomes.4 
Landlords’ ability to skimp on maintenance and repairs and 
arbitrarily evict tenants protected by rent regulations undermines the 
basic goal of protecting existing tenants.  To address this issue and 
support tenant stability more generally, rent regulation programs aim 
to prevent evictions, harassment, and decreases in services or 
maintenance.5  New York City’s Rent Guidelines Board lists 
 
 1. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-501, recodified in § 26-502 (2018). The New York 
State legislature passed significant reforms to the rent regulation system in June 2019, 
S.B. S6548, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), as this Article was being written, and this 
Article makes efforts to address both the old and new systems. 
 2. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.010 (2019). 
 3. D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985). 
 4. CITY OF UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(D) (2017). The stated purpose 
of Union City, New Jersey’s ordinance, by comparison, “is to maintain rental 
apartments that are affordable for mid and lower income residents of the City.” Id. § 
334-1(F). 
 5. PRASANNA RAJASEKARAN ET AL., URB. INST., RENT CONTROL: WHAT DOES 
THE RESEARCH TELL US ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL ACTION? 1 (2019) 
[hereinafter URB. INST.], 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99646/rent_control._what_does_t
he_research_tell_us_about_the_effectiveness_of_local_action_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SF2H-M4YX]. 
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protecting “habitability and security of tenure” as one of its goals.6  
One of the objectives in D.C.’s rent regulation statute is to “continue 
to improve the administrative machinery for the resolution of 
disputes and controversies between housing providers and tenants.”7  
Union City, New Jersey’s ordinance explains that, at the time its 
passage, tenants were reluctant to complain about exorbitant rent 
increases or the deterioration of housing without protections like just 
cause eviction.8 
A number of jurisdictions articulate a broader intent to avoid or 
alleviate the crisis in housing affordability.  San Francisco’s Rent 
Board describes the purpose of its program as “alleviat[ing] the city’s 
housing crisis.”9  Union City’s rent regulation ordinance states that 
“[u]nless residential rents of tenants are regulated and controlled, 
there will be an inevitable housing crisis that will inevitably lead to 
homelessness.”10 Takoma Park, Maryland’s rent regulation website 
describes the program as “designed to preserve the city’s affordable 
housing stock.”11 
Some jurisdictions adopt rent regulations in part to preserve the 
diversity of their populations.  Takoma Park’s rent regulations are 
designed in part to “maintain economic and ethnic diversity.”12  
Union City, New Jersey’s rent regulations are justified in part by “the 
public interest to have a cross section of people residing in Union City 
 
 6. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., MAIN FEATURES OF RENT STABILIZATION 59 
(2010), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/history/mainfeaturesofrs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5UK-CFAD]. According to the Rent Guidelines Board, the 
purpose is three-fold: (1) to “preserve the basic affordability of rental housing;” (2) to 
protect “habitability and security of tenure;” and (3) to produce “fair returns for 
affected owners.” Id. 
 7. D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985). 
 8. UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(D) (2017) (“The fear of being evicted 
without just cause and being forced to seek housing in such a market discourages 
Union City tenants from complaining about exorbitant increases in rent and about 
the continued deterioration of housing.”). New Jersey has since legislated just-cause 
eviction protections statewide. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:18-61.1–61.12 (1988) (“the 
Anti-Eviction Act”). 
 9. The Mission of the Rent Board, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F. RENT BOARD, 
https://sfrb.org/mission-rent-board [https://perma.cc/A7WS-Q58J] (last visited Oct. 2, 
2019). 
 10. UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(E) (2017). 
 11. Rent Stabilization, CITY OF TAKOMA PARK HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV., 
https://takomaparkmd.gov/government/housing-and-community-development/rental-
housing/rent-stabilization/ [https://perma.cc/KUW7-NJYG] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 12. Id. 
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across all socio-economic backgrounds.”13  Oakland defines the 
purpose of its rent adjustment program as “foster[ing] fair housing for 
a diverse population of renters.”14 
Some of these goals may be in tension.  For example, protecting 
the affordability of the existing housing stock may make housing 
overall less affordable by discouraging, rather than encouraging, the 
construction of new rental housing;15 the continuing operation of 
rental properties as rentals;16 or adequate maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the rental stock.17  Additionally, protecting existing 
tenants may undermine, rather than advance, the diversity of the 
population.18  Further, rent regulation might facilitate discrimination 
by creating excess demand, thereby making it easier for landlords to 
handpick their tenants.19 
Accordingly, jurisdictions try to balance the aim of providing 
tenants with stable and affordable housing with concern for market 
incentives and landlords’ abilities to earn fair returns on their 
investments.  Some make a point of stating that the purposes of their 
rent regulation programs include “provid[ing] incentives for the 
construction of new rental units and the rehabilitation of vacant 
 
 13. UNION CITY, N.J., ORDINANCE § 334-1(D) (2017). 
 14. Rent Adjustment Program, CITY OF OAKLAND, 
https://www.oaklandca.gov/topics/rent-adjustment-program [https://perma.cc/VN4P-
CPRW] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 15. See Richard Arnott, Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?, 9 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 99, 99 (1995). But see John I. Gilderbloom & Lin Ye, Thirty Years of Rent 
Control: A Survey of New Jersey Cities, 29 J. URB. AFF. 207, 211 (2007) (finding no 
statistically significant relationship between rent control policies and new 
construction in New Jersey between 1990 and 2000). 
 16. See generally Rebecca Diamond et al., The Effects of Rent Control 
Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco 
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24181, 2017). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard Arnott & Elizaveta Shevyakhova, Tenancy Rent Control 
and Credible Commitment in Maintenance, 47 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 72, 82–83 
(2014); David H. Autor et al., Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of 
Rent Control in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 122 J. POL. ECON. 661, 673–74 (2014); 
David P. Sims, Out of Control: What Can We Learn from the End of Massachusetts 
Rent Control?, 61 J. URB. ECON. 129, 143–46 (2007). 
 18. See Ed Glaeser, Does Rent Control Reduce Segregation?, 10 SWED. ECON. 
POL’Y REV. 179, 199 (2003); URB. INST., supra note 5, at 2, 7. But see Diamond et al., 
supra note 16, at 3. Diversity of the population depends on how the incomes, race, 
and ethnicity of renters whose buildings are rent regulated in a city compare with 
those of the renters in unregulated buildings, or those of newcomers who may have 
trouble securing a home to rent. 
 19. See Richard B. Mackenzie & Dwight R. Lee, How Economists Understate the 
Damage from Rent Controls, CATO INST., REG. 22, 22–23 (2019), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2018/12/regulation-
v41n4-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BJC-8MKG]. 
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rental units”20 or “encouraging rehabilitation of rental units” and 
“investment in new residential rental property.”21  Others specifically 
note the importance of allowing landlords subject to the regulation to 
make a “fair return,”22 “fair and adequate rents,”23 or a “reasonable 
rate of return on their investments.”24  Oakland states that its goals 
include “allowing efficient rental property owners the opportunity for 
both a fair return on their property and rental income sufficient to 
cover the increasing cost of repairs, maintenance, insurance, 
employee services, additional amenities, and other costs of 
operation.”25 
B. Existing Research and Challenges 
Studying how well rent regulation serves the goals jurisdictions 
articulate for their programs is challenging.  Chief among these 
obstacles is that rent regulation laws are relatively static, presenting 
few opportunities to examine the effects of a change in policy.26  It is 
difficult to identify control groups when policies do change because 
the properties excluded from regulations within a jurisdiction are 
often idiosyncratic.27  Comparisons between jurisdictions are 
problematic because cities that adopt changes to rent regulations may 
be experiencing very different market pressures than those that do 
not change or do not have rent regulation programs.28  Even when 
plausible control groups do exist, data on rent and tenant outcomes 
are difficult to come by.  Finally, because of the potential for 
variability in both regulations and market conditions, scholars must 
be cautious in assuming the evidence of the effects of rent regulations 
from one jurisdiction will generalize to another. 
The best evidence we have on the impacts of rent regulation 
provides support for the idea that there are trade-offs among the 
goals jurisdictions articulate for their programs.  Rebecca Diamond, 
Timothy McQuade, and Franklin Qian used uniquely comprehensive 
data to exploit an expansion of rent controls in San Francisco in 
 
 20. D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985). 
 21. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.010 (2019). 
 22. MAIN FEATURES OF RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 6, at 59. 
 23. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.1(b)(6) (2001). 
 24. D.C. CODE § 42-3501.02 (1985). 
 25. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.010(C) (2019). 
 26. Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 7; Rent Adjustment Program, supra note 14. 
 27. See Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 7. 
 28. Id. at 2. 
2019] LABORATORIES OF REGULATION 1047 
1994.29  They found that tenants in rent-regulated units enjoyed lower 
rents and, on average, stayed in their homes longer.30  However, rent 
regulation prompted some landlords to demolish their units to make 
way for new construction or to convert them into other uses.31  
Ultimately, this led to a reduction in rental supply, a housing stock 
that served higher-income individuals, and higher rents citywide.32  
Accordingly, sitting tenants generally benefited, but other renters and 
those wanting to move into the city encountered fewer units and 
higher rents.33  Further, they found that tenants who lived in areas 
with the highest rent appreciation and who had only been at their 
current address for a few years were less likely to remain at their 
addresses than tenants in the control group of similar buildings not 
subject to the expansion of rent regulation.34 
Similarly, Brian Asquith used an instrumental variable approach35 
to study whether increases in San Francisco housing prices led owners 
of rent-regulated buildings or units to convert their properties to 
unregulated uses.36  He found that landlords respond to rising prices 
by withdrawing their units and buildings from the rent-regulated 
system.37  Specifically, landlords convert their properties to 
 
 29. See id. at 5. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Id. at 3. 
 32. Id. at 12, 26–27. 
Taken together, we see rent control increased property investment, spurred 
the demolition and reconstruction of new buildings, generated conversion of 
rental units to owner occupied housing, and caused a decline of the number 
of renters per building. All of these responses lead to a housing stock which 
caters to higher income individuals. Rent control has actually fueled the 
gentrification of San Francisco, the exact opposite of the policy’s intended 
goal. 
Id. at 12. 
 33. Id. at 25–27. 
 34. See generally id. 
 35. Instrumental variable estimation is a statistical approach that helps to identify 
causal relationships. See Kenneth A. Bollen, Instrumental Variables in Sociology and 
the Social Sciences, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 37, 38 (2012), 
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150141 
[https://perma.cc/P3EE-MPCV]. A valid instrument is a variable that affects a key 
explanatory variable but only affects the outcome of interest indirectly, through that 
explanatory variable.  See id. at 37. 
 36. See generally Brian Asquith, Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing Supply 
Under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in San Francisco (Upjohn Inst. for 
Emp’t Research, Working Paper No. 19-296, 2019), 
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1314&context=up_workingpa
pers [https://perma.cc/4A9Q-QJ5H]. 
 37. Id. at 5, 8–9. 
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condominiums or other ownership forms, demolish them, or occupy 
them as their own homes.38  Asquith also found that when the city 
tried to limit such conversions, landlords responded by taking more 
tenants to court for at-fault evictions.39 
David P. Sims used the end of rent control after a ballot 
referendum in Massachusetts to study the effects of rent control in the 
Boston metropolitan area.40 He found that ending rent control had 
little effect on new construction in the years immediately following 
decontrol.41  But it resulted in many units switching from owner to 
tenant occupancy, suggesting that rent control had encouraged 
owners to convert rental units to other uses to avoid regulations.42  
Although there was little evidence that the end of rent control was 
associated with a reduction in major maintenance problems such as 
plumbing and heating failures, it was associated with a reduction in 
“chronic aesthetic” issues, such as peeling paint, suggesting that rent 
control had discouraged maintenance of the regulated stock.43 
In sum, existing research suggests it can be difficult, if not 
impossible, both to protect existing tenants from rising rents and 
evictions and to ensure the affordability, quality, and longevity of the 
rental housing stock.  Experimenting with different combinations of 
features and strategies might offer new insights that can help 
policymakers better balance these multiple goals, but exploring these 
possibilities first requires a detailed look at the design choices 
available. 
II. FEATURES AND TRADE-OFFS OF RENT REGULATION: DEFINING 
THE REGULATED UNIVERSE 
Observers, both critics and advocates, tend to regard the adoption 
of rent regulation as a binary choice; however, policymakers must 
make a host of decisions when enacting rent regulations.  Legislators 
must decide, among other things, how broadly the program will apply; 
how annual increases will be determined; and the rights of tenants in 
regulated units.  All of these choices involve difficult trade-offs. 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 40–41. 
 40. See generally Sims, supra note 17. 
 41. Id. at 140–43. 
 42. Id. Note that effects found are a result of ending rent control and may not 
apply to the introduction or continuation of rent controls. Id. 
 43. Id. at 143–44. 
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Because many states prohibit or preempt rent regulation, the 
number of jurisdictions without rent regulations dwarfs the number 
with them.  Thirty-two states expressly ban all forms of rent control, 
while nine others allow it in principle but have no rent-regulating 
jurisdictions.44  Only California, the District of Columbia, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, and, very recently, Oregon, have any 
jurisdictions with rent regulation programs.45  Nevertheless, as the 
following sections will illustrate, there is considerable diversity among 
the existing rent regulation programs.46  The survey reveals that a 
wide range of programs fall under the umbrella of rent regulation, 
and shows that jurisdictions considering implementing new rent 
regulation programs have a variety of models to choose from. 
This Article explores the policy choices jurisdictions with rent 
regulation programs have made, beginning with the choices that 
shape the basic features of a rent regulation program and the universe 
of regulated properties. Accordingly, this Part explores the breadth of 
rent regulation programs, the various ways in which units can become 
deregulated, and how different jurisdictions monitor and enforce the 
requirements of regulation. 
A. Breadth of Program 
i. The Universe of Regulated Properties 
The first key decision is which properties to regulate.  Casting a 
broader net  protects more sitting tenants but risks discouraging 
investment in new construction.47  Policymakers can restrict the scope 
of regulations by covering only those buildings built after a certain 
date;48 by exempting small or owner-occupied buildings;49 or by 
 
 44. NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, RENT CONTROL BY STATE LAW (2019), 
https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/advocacy/rent-control/Rent-Control-by-State-
Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQF-MNM2]. 
 45. See id.; see, e.g., S. Res. 608, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); URB. INST., 
supra note 5, at 3. 
 46. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 47. See Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 3 (explaining that San Francisco 
legislators exempted new construction from rent control due to concerns that rent 
control would discourage new development). 
 48. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.030(A)(5) (2019); D.C. CODE § 
42–3502.05(2) (1985); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1(A)(4) (2018). 
 49. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.030(A)(8); D.C. CODE § 42–
3502.05(3); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1(A)(1). 
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excluding high-rent units or high-income tenants from coverage.50  
Jurisdictions have made a variety of decisions about which homes to 
regulate.  The proportion of all rental units that are rent-regulated 
varies considerably by city, from approximately 45% of rental units in 
New York City to 80% of multifamily units in Los Angeles.51  These 
figures are not static but rather a function of any given program’s 
mechanisms for entry to and exit from the regulated market.  
Additional units may become regulated as a condition of participation 
for tax incentives or other programs designed to expand the supply of 
affordable or market rate housing.52  The deregulation mechanisms 
explored later in this Part allow units to exit the regulated market. 
Regulating the rents charged in new buildings is particularly 
problematic, as such restrictions might encourage conversions to 
owner-occupied housing, leading to a reduced supply of affordable 
rental housing.53  Further, the high cost of construction and the strong 
demand for housing in many cities means that unless new buildings 
are subsidized or built as part of an inclusionary housing program, 
they will rarely provide homes affordable to low- and moderate-
income renters.54  Regulating rents in new buildings thus will confer 
benefits on wealthier tenants least in need of protection. 
Most systems do not cover new buildings, other than those 
accepting rent regulation as a condition for a benefit.55  The date that 
 
 50. High-Rent Vacancy and High-Rent High-Income Deregulation, N.Y. STATE 
HOMES & COMMUNITY RENEWAL (2018), https://hcr.ny.gov/high-rent-vacancy-high-
income-deregulation [https://perma.cc/2A9L-ZAYL]. 
 51. See Recommendation Report, CITY OF L.A. DEP’T CITY PLANNING exhibit 
B.1, 7 (2018), https://planning.lacity.org/ordinances/docs/HomeSharing/StaffRept.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8WYN-4LQ6]. In 2017, 44% of all New York City units were rent-
stabilized and 1% were subject to rent control. See id. at 7, n.5; N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF 
HOUS. PRES. & DEV., SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2017 NEW YORK CITY 
HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 11 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/2017-hvs-initial-findings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TS22-JMCZ]. 
 52. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #41 TAX ABATEMENTS 
(2019), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/09/FACT20SHEET2041.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SCV8-GBAZ]. In New York, for example, rent stabilization applies 
to buildings that receive J-51 and 421-a tax benefits. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 9, §§ 2520.11(o)–(p) (2014). 
 53. See Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 12, 30. 
 54. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL 
HOUSING: EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR DIVERSE AND GROWING DEMAND 17 fig.14 
(2015), 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/americas_rental_housing_2015_web.p
df [https://perma.cc/8AP3-R78E]. 
 55. For an example of a jurisdiction providing benefits in exchange for agreement 
to rent-regulated status, see New York’s “421-a” tax abatement program. N.Y. COMP. 
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determines which existing units are covered is usually right before 
rent regulation legislation passed.  The earliest of these is New York 
state, where rent stabilization does not apply to buildings built after 
1974 unless those buildings receive certain property tax abatements,56 
while Oakland and Jersey City use 1983,57 and Oregon’s recently 
passed legislation exempts properties built in the last 15 years.58 
Other jurisdictions choose not to exclude new construction 
categorically and instead provide only an exemption period from 
regulation, after which new buildings enter the regulated market.  
Newark’s rent regulation ordinance, for example, does not apply to 
newly-constructed multiple dwellings either for 30 years following 
construction completion or for the building’s initial mortgage loan’s 
amortization period, whichever is less.59  Takoma Park grants a much 
shorter exemption of only five years.60  Jersey City gives exemptions 
only to new buildings located in designated “redevelopment areas,” 
intending to encourage the rehabilitation or replacement of 
substandard housing in existing communities.61  The extent to which 
these exemption periods help moderate the disincentive to build new 
 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(p) (2014); FACT SHEET #41 TAX ABATEMENTS, 
supra note 52. 
 56. See Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL. 
LAW § 5(a)(5) (2019). 
 57. See OAKLAND, CAL. MUN. CODE § 8.22.030 (2019); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE 
OF ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018). 
 58. See S. Res. 608, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). 
 59. NEWARK, N.J., ORDINANCE § 19:2-18.1 (2019). 
 60. TAKOMA PARK, MD., MUN. CODE § 6.20.030(A)(3) (2007). 
 61. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1(A)(4) (2018) (exempting 
“[n]ewly constructed dwellings with 25 or more dwelling units located within a 
redevelopment area as defined in Section 5 of the Redevelopment Agencies Law, 
N.J.S.A. 40:55C-5(o), for which the City Council has approved a redevelopment plan, 
in accordance with Section 17 of the Redevelopment Agencies Law, N.J.S.A. 40:55C-
17.”). The relevant section defines “Urban redevelopment area[s]” as “previously 
developed portions of areas: (1) Delineated on the State Plan Policy Map (SPPM) as 
the Metropolitan Planning Area (PA1), Designated Centers, Cores or Nodes; (2) 
Designated as CAFRA Centers, Cores or Nodes; (3) Designated as Urban Enterprise 
Zones; and (4) Designated as Urban Coordinating Council Empowerment 
Neighborhoods.” Id. § 345-74(2); see also Redevelopment, N.J. FUTURE, 
https://www.njfuture.org/issues/development/redevelopment/ [https://perma.cc/T2AP-
MTJJ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (“Redevelopment is reinvestment in neighborhoods 
and commercial areas to replace or repair previously developed buildings or plots of 
land that are in substandard condition or are no longer useful in their current state. 
Redevelopment sites can be found in urban, suburban and rural locations, as well as 
on ‘brownfields’ that may be contaminated by a previous industrial use. 
Redevelopment is a core component of smart growth because it promotes 
development in existing communities with infrastructure and away from critical 
environmental lands and resources.”). 
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homes has not been well-researched.  Furthermore, even categorically 
exempting new buildings may not address the disincentive to 
investment.  Investment may still decrease if market actors fear the 
trigger will be moved forward with subsequent legislation. 
Jurisdictions may also choose to exempt small rental buildings.  
Many exclude single-family homes.62  Others exclude dwellings below 
a certain size.  For example, rent stabilization applies only to 
buildings with six or more units in New York City;63 and  four or 
more units in Jersey City.64  Los Angeles differentiates between 
single-family homes occupying a single parcel, which are not subject 
to rent regulation, and those that are two or more to a parcel, which 
are.65 
The justification for such exemptions is that, unless they own many 
buildings, owners of small buildings generally have less market power 
over rents and should not be burdened with the administrative costs 
of regulation.66  If they find regulations to be burdensome, owners of 
small rental properties may find it easier to convert their apartments 
into condominiums.  In studying the expansion of rent regulation in 
San Francisco to some buildings with fewer than five apartments, 
Diamond, McQuade, and Qian found that newly covered buildings 
were 8% more likely to convert to a condominium or other form of 
for-sale unit than the small buildings that remained unregulated.67 
The D.C. Code distinguishes between corporate and individual 
owners and between number of units owned and building size, 
exempting rental buildings owned by individual — rather than 
 
 62. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL. MUN. CODE § 8.22.030 (2019) (exemptions in 
ordinances); D.C. CODE § 42-3502.05 (1985) (same); JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018) (same). 
 63. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504 (2018); see also Rent Stabilized Buildings 
List, NYC RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/resources/rent-stabilized-building-
lists.page#tell [https://perma.cc/P8ZT-B9ZU] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019). 
 64. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018). 
 65. The ordinance thus applies to duplex conversions to condominiums as well as 
garage conversions to residential occupancy. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 151.00–
.30 (2011).  California state law only allows jurisdictions to apply rent regulation to 
properties with two or more units. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 151.07(A)(1)(a) (1989). 
 66. See Rebecca Diamond, What Does Economic Evidence Tell Us About the 
Effects of Rent Control?, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 18, 2018) [hereinafter Diamond, 
Economic Evidence], https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economic-
evidence-tell-us-about-the-effects-of-rent-control/ [https://perma.cc/HR33-Q9ZK] 
(“Smaller multi-family buildings were exempt from this 1979 law change since they 
were viewed as more ‘mom and pop’ ventures, and did not have market power over 
rents.”). 
 67. Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 12. 
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corporate — landlords who own four or fewer units.68  Until May 
2019, by contrast, Oakland’s ordinance distinguished based on owner 
occupancy, exempting two- or three-unit buildings for at least two 
years.69 
ii. Tenant Income Qualifications 
One of the common goals of rent regulation programs is to provide 
affordable rental housing, a target that is particularly difficult to reach 
for lower-income households.70  There is also a persistent public 
discomfort with wealthier households’ benefiting from rent 
regulation.71  Despite this, there does not appear to be any 
jurisdiction that regulates rents only when tenants have lower 
incomes.  Several arguments can be made for not targeting incomes, 
one being the risk that landlords will avoid renting to lower-income 
households.  Means testing can also impose high administrative 
costs,72 many of which can be avoided by using proxies for wealth to 
limit the applicability of rent regulation, such as exemptions for 
 
 68. See D.C. CODE § 42-3502.05(a)(3) (1985). 
 69. See OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.030 (2019); Ali Tadayon, Oakland 
Scraps Rent Control Exemption for Owner-Occupied Duplexes, EAST BAY TIMES 
(May 24, 2019, 4:16 AM) https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2019/05/23/oakland-scraps-
rent-control-exemption-for-owner-occupied-duplexes [https://perma.cc/8QX7-78AJ]. 
 70. In New York City, proportions of low-income households in rent stabilized 
housing are higher than in unregulated households and the proportions of rent 
burdened households are similar. See C.R. WAICKMAN ET AL., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF 
HOUS. PRES. & DEV., AFFORDABILITY OF RENT STABILIZED UNITS (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/about/rent-regulation-memo-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7Z4-EVWK]. 
 71. See, e.g., Jeremiah Budin, Millionaires Living in Rent-Stabilized Apartments, 
CURBED N.Y. (Apr. 30, 2014, 2:25 PM), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2014/4/30/10107290/millionaires-living-in-rent-stabilized-
apartments [https://perma.cc/K8HN-PCHT]; James Fanelli, Rent-Stabilized 
Apartments Are Being Occupied by Millionaires, Records Show, DNAINFO (Apr. 30, 
2014, 6:41 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20140430/new-york-city/rent-
stabilized-apartments-are-being-occupied-by-millionaires-records-show/ 
[https://perma.cc/6UVQ-4BT9]; Scott James, How the Rich Get Richer, Rental 
Edition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/us/san-
francisco-rent-control-and-unintended-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/5TSZ-
K377]; Peter D. Salins & Gerard Mildner, Does Rent Control Help the Poor?, CITY 
J. (1991), https://www.city-journal.org/html/does-rent-control-help-poor-12772.html 
[https://perma.cc/N9BV-N2GJ]. 
 72. See Timothy Besley, Means Testing Versus Universal Provision in Poverty 
Alleviation Programs, 57 ECONOMICA 119, 119–20 (1990); Wim Van Oorschot, 
Targeting Welfare: On the Functions and Dysfunctions of Means Testing in Social 
Policy, in WORLD POVERTY: NEW POLICIES TO DEFEAT AN OLD ENEMY 171, 174–75 
(David Gordon & Peter Townsend eds., 2002). 
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single-family homes.73  Choosing to forego means testing also has the 
potential to expand political support for rent regulation programs by 
increasing the number of households with a stake in those programs.74 
Although no jurisdictions currently means-test tenants moving into 
rent-regulated units, a bill was introduced in 2018 in the Illinois 
General Assembly that explored this possibility, overturning the 
state’s ban on rent regulation and requiring means-tested rent 
regulation.75  The provisions were eliminated from the version of the 
bill introduced in 2019,76 but called for regional rent control boards to 
set targeted rent caps for “Tier 1” households earning 60% or less of a 
county’s Area Median Income (AMI) and “Tier 2” households 
earning 120% or less of AMI.77  The 2018 bill would also have also 
provided an income tax credit for landlords renting to Tier 1 or Tier 2 
households,78 which could reduce the likelihood that such measures 
would otherwise disincentivize landlords from accepting low-income 
tenants.  Creating such a granular means-testing scheme would 
require substantial administrative investment. 
Until recent reforms eliminated this method of decontrol,79 New 
York State balanced the need to target benefits and the costs of 
administering means-testing by adopting a “high-rent/high-income” 
deregulation.80  A unit became deregulated when the income of the 
 
 73. Some jurisdictions — including Maryland, New Jersey, and Indiana — provide 
benefits to low-income renters, such as renters’ tax credits, that are conditioned on 
income, but do not impose means testing in their rent regulation programs. Because 
such credits typically are administered through the income tax system, conditioning 
them on income is relatively easy. See NJ Income Tax Property Tax 
Deduction/Credit for Homeowners and Tenants, N.J. DEP’T TREASURY, 
https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/njit35.shtml [https://perma.cc/583F-QN6Q] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2019); Renters’ Tax Credits, MD. DEP’T ASSESSMENTS & 
TAXATION, https://dat.maryland.gov/realproperty/Pages/Renters’-Tax-Credits.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/WZ3E-XZGA] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019); Tax Deduction Details, 
IND. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.in.gov/dor/5863.htm#renters 
[https://perma.cc/XVD5-W7SZ] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 74. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable 
Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 428–29 
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991). 
 75. S.B. 3512, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018). 
 76. H.B. 2192, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019). 
 77. Ill. S.B. 3512 § 5. 
 78. Id. § 905. 
 79. As previously noted, the New York State legislature passed significant 
reforms to the rent regulation system in June 2019, S.B. S6548, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2019), as this Article was being written. 
 80. See N.Y. DEP’T OF HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, DEREGULATION RENT AND 
INCOME THRESHOLDS (2018), 
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household occupying the unit exceeded $200,000 for the two 
preceding years, and the unit reached a Deregulation Rent Threshold 
(DRT).81  To initiate the deregulation process, the owner of a 
regulated apartment was required to serve a tenant with an Income 
Certification Form, which obligated the tenant to certify whether the 
household income exceeded $200,000 in the two preceding years.82  If 
so, the owner could file an Owner’s Petition for Deregulation with the 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, which would issue an 
order deregulating the unit when the current lease expired.83  Thus, 
New York’s method of excluding high-income households from rent 
regulation was a blunt instrument that is relatively simple to 
administer.  Additionally, this system removed a unit permanently 
from the regulated housing stock, even if a future tenant’s income was 
lower than $200,000.84  This mechanism was done away with in June 
2019, however, and there does not appear to be any other 
jurisdictions that deregulates units based on high rents or high 
household incomes. 
B. Deregulation 
The next set of relevant decisions concern when, if at all, landlords 
may be allowed to remove units from regulation.  More lenient 
deregulation makes it easier to decrease the stock of rent-regulated 
housing.  But providing more flexibility to landlords may help to limit 
the extent to which rent regulation dampens overall investment in 
housing.  Jurisdictions may decide to condition deregulation on a 
landlord’s paying tenants’ relocation costs or contributing to a fund to 
support affordable housing.  Deciding on the appropriate levels of 
compensation is challenging.  Payments may be ineffective if they are 
too low, doing little to either slow the pace of deregulation or to 
contribute to addressing broader affordability challenges 
meaningfully.  If they are too high, they are likely to discourage 
investment. 
Rent regulation ordinances specify the mechanisms through which 
units leave the regulated market, and the scope of these provisions 
 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/10/deregulationrentincomethreshold.p
df [https://perma.cc/R3ZY-ZZ3H]. 
 81. The DRT was $2774.76 before it was abolished in 2019. See id. 
 82. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504.3 (repealed 2019) (providing an example of 
how courts apply the Income Certification Form requirement); DEREGULATION 
RENT AND INCOME THRESHOLDS, supra note 80 (providing 2019 DRT). 
 83. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-504.3 (repealed 2019). 
 84. See DEREGULATION RENT AND INCOME THRESHOLDS, supra note 80. 
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plays a significant role in shaping a jurisdiction’s regulated housing 
stock.  Until recently, New York City’s high-rent and high-income 
deregulation85 was an example of one such mechanism.  A unit could 
also become deregulated if the rent reached a Deregulation 
Threshold, which was $2774.76 as of early 2019.86  In 2017, the median 
asking rent for units advertised for lease was $2695.87  The new law 
passed in June 2019 also eliminated this high-rent vacancy decontrol.  
Units in New York City may still become deregulated through 
conversion into a cooperative or condominium,88 substantial 
rehabilitation of a substandard building,89 conversion to commercial 
or professional use, condemnation, or demolition.90  Finally, landlords 
may, in some cases, evict tenants if they move into the property 
themselves, and may offer their tenants “buyouts” or compensatory 
payments for leaving.91  Many of these provisions are common across 
jurisdictions.  However, the Oakland City Council recently removed 
“substantial rehabilitation” as a mechanism for deregulation.92  The 
Ellis Act also plays a significant role in shaping deregulation in 
California, allowing owners to exit rent control if they take units off 
the rental market entirely to sell or live in.93  A 2007 Los Angeles 
ordinance requires landlords who demolish rent-stabilized units under 
the Ellis Act and construct rental units on the same property within 
 
 85. See supra Part II.A.ii. 
 86. High-Rent Vacancy and High-Rent High-Income Deregulation, supra note 
50. 
 87. NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND 
NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2017 24 (2017), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_2017_Full_2018-08-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FT6E-U6K2]. 
 88. Tenants whose buildings are being converted into cooperatives or 
condominiums must be offered an opportunity to purchase their units and, even 
following conversion, sitting tenants’ units remain rent-regulated. See N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, §§ 18.1, 23.1 (2019). 
 89. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11(e)(3) (2019). 
 90. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO THE RENT STABILIZED HOUSING 
STOCK IN NEW YORK CITY IN 2017 5 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/changes18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9QR-9PEJ]. 
 91. Diamond, Economic Evidence, supra note 66, at 3 (“In practice, these transfer 
payments from landlords are quite common and can be quite large.”). 
 92. Ali Tadayon, Oakland Moves Toward Ending Rent Control Exemption, EAST 
BAY TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2018/09/20/oakland-
moves-toward-ending-rent-control-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/23EQ-QPBS]; see 
also Oakland, Cal., Ordinance No. 13523 (Mar. 29, 2019) (amending Oakland 
Municipal Code § 8.22.030 to eliminate the substantially rehabilitation exemption). 
 93. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7060–7060.7 (2019). 
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five years to replace the demolished units with the same number of 
regulated units or 20% of all new units, whichever is greater.94 
Abolition of rent regulation is, of course, the most absolute form of 
deregulation.  Such an abolition occurred in Massachusetts when 
voters approved a 1994 ballot referendum ending rent control 
statewide.  At the time, three cities in Massachusetts — Boston, 
Cambridge, and Brookline — had rent regulation ordinances.95 
C. Tracking and Enforcement 
Jurisdictions also need to decide how to monitor and enforce 
whatever regulations they choose to adopt.  Monitoring and 
enforcement may take place at the state level, as in New York,96 or 
through local governments, as in California and New Jersey.97  
Monitoring compliance requires a registry of rent-regulated units and 
an effective system for monitoring increases.  Absent a registry of 
regulated buildings, it is difficult for tenants to know the level of rent 
they should be paying.  In New York City, owners must register rent-
stabilized buildings98 and file annual rent registrations.99  These 
reports are not public, which might undermine accountability.  
Oakland does not maintain any registry of rent-regulated buildings, 
posing substantial complications for enforcement efforts.100 
Jurisdictions must also determine what penalties to impose for 
noncompliance.  In 2011, Hoboken residents voted to impose limits 
on a system under which tenants could collect retroactive rent 
 
 94. L.A., CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 151.28(A)–(B) (2007). 
 95. Battle Goes on as Rent Control Is Defeated in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/22/us/battle-goes-on-as-rent-
control-is-defeated-in-massachusetts.html [https://perma.cc/SS6N-4W9N]. 
 96. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-517 (2019). 
 97. See, e.g., JERSEY CITY, N.J. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1 (2018); Rent 
Control, CITY OF NEWARK, N.J., https://www.newarknj.gov/departments/rentcontrol 
[https://perma.cc/42L5-4PVF] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019); The Mission of the Rent 
Board, CITY & CTY. OF S.F. RENT BD., https://sfrb.org/mission-rent-board 
[https://perma.cc/LN7X-L2BS] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 98. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-517 (2019). 
 99. Id. § 26-517(f). 
 100. See Bigad Shaban et al., Lack of Oversight May Be Allowing Some Oakland 
Landlords to Wrongfully Evict Families, Elderly, NBC BAY AREA (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/investigations/Lack-of-Oversight-May-be-Allowing-
Some-Oakland-Landlords-to-Wrongfully-Evict-Families-Elderly-474352123.html 
[https://perma.cc/7J44-MLXT] (“Although copies of all eviction notices are kept on 
file at Oakland’s Department of Housing and Community Development, city officials 
tell the Investigative Unit no one is currently tracking how many owner move-in 
evictions occur each year, let alone attempt to determine how many of those evictions 
may be fraudulent.”). 
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overcharges from landlords.101  Under the old system, tenants who 
believed they were being overcharged could petition the Rent 
Leveling Board and, if successful, collect all past overcharges.102  
Disputes between landlords and tenants commonly arose from a lack 
of documentation.103  In 2006, the city began requiring landlords to 
file annual forms documenting the legal rents for their units.104  The 
2011 vote then limited the scope of the past overcharges tenants could 
collect to two years of rent.105 
The Office of Rent Administration within the Division of Housing 
and Community Renewal (DHCR) oversees New York’s rent 
regulation program.106  Based on DHCR findings, treble damages are 
available for many violations, including willful overcharges.107  
Tenants may also, of their own initiative, apply for rent reductions if 
landlords fail to provide services.108 
In San Francisco, imposing an unlawful increase is a misdemeanor 
punishable by a $1000 mandatory fine and, potentially, up to six 
months of jail time, as is unlawfully recovering possession of a 
regulated apartment.109  The city grants tenants a private right of 
action for injunctive relief and treble damages for both rent 
overcharges and harassment.110  The City Attorney can also bring 
civil actions against landlords.111  Additionally, nonprofit tenants’ 
rights organizations may sue for rent overcharges and harassment if 
neither the tenant nor the City Attorney has taken the case.112 
 
 101. See Heather Haddon, New Jersey’s Rent-Control Laws Fading, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 12, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204358004577032473909862662 
[https://perma.cc/KN37-H6WW]. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See HOBOKEN, N.J., GEN. REG. § 155-4(A)(1) (2011). 
 105. See Haddon, supra note 101. 
 106. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION 
AND RENT CONTROL 1 (2018), https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/fact-
sheet-1-sj-final-12-19-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/82M2-7EXM]. 
 107. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2526.1 (2005). 
 108. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-514 (2019); FACT SHEET #1 RENT STABILIZATION 
AND RENT CONTROL, supra note 106, at 2. See generally N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & 
CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #14 RENT REDUCTIONS FOR DECREASED SERVICES 
(2016), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/12/orafac14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XM9Y-TN7B]. 
 109. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 37.10B(c) (2019); 37.11A(a) (2017). 
 110. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.11A(a). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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III. FEATURES AND TRADE-OFFS OF RENT REGULATION: SETTING 
RENT INCREASES 
Establishing permissible rent increases is the core task of rent 
regulation.  Here, too, jurisdictions must make several decisions.  
First, jurisdictions must decide how annual, across-the-board 
increases will be determined.  Numerous situations may also compel 
jurisdictions to allow increases beyond the annual rate.  Jurisdictions 
may decide, for example, to compensate landlords for the costs of 
capital or other improvements through rent increases or instead to 
permit larger-than-usual rent increases when units become vacant.  
They must also decide whether landlords can “bank” unused 
increases and apply them in future years, and how to determine when 
a landlord has not received a fair rate of return on the property.  This 
Part outlines the trade-offs that jurisdictions face at each of these 
junctures as well as the diversity of schemes that have arisen in 
response. 
A. Process of Setting Rent Increases 
A set of critical choices surrounds allowable annual rent increases.  
The first issue concerns the process.  Jurisdictions can opt to use a 
pre-determined formula; or create an agency, board or other body; or 
charge an existing institution to set increases.113  Using a formula — 
for example, setting maximum rent increases by reference to a 
specified measure of inflation114 — simplifies the process 
considerably, but it may understate or overstate costs if changes in 
building operating costs diverge substantially from the index selected.  
An agency or board may be able to incorporate more information and 
be more nuanced, but that entity may be vulnerable to political or 
other pressures. 
Even jurisdictions with annual increases fixed by or based on price 
indexes must choose which index to peg to and whether to increase or 
decrease from the index figure.  There is substantial variation in the 
indices used to determine allowable annual rent increases.  In D.C., 
for example, the Rental Housing Commission has determined that 
across-the-board increases to which landlords are entitled for rent-
regulated units should equal the increase in the consumer price index 
 
 113. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(h)(2)(A) (1985); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-
510 (2006); WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.36.020 (1997); MAIN 
FEATURES OF RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 6, at 75; Rent Control, supra note 97. 
 114. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(h)(2)(A) (1985) (pegging annual increases 
to CPI); Rent Control, supra note 97 (same). 
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(CPI) plus 2%.115  In West Hollywood, it is 75% of the CPI for greater 
Los Angeles.116  In Jersey City, the annual increase, set by the City 
Council, is tied more directly to the increase in the cost of living 
during the lease term.117  The annual increase cannot exceed 4% or, 
alternatively, the percentage difference between the CPI three 
months before the lease expires and three months before the lease 
began, whichever is less.118 
Many jurisdictions vest the determination of the annual rent 
increases in rent boards, which may be elected or appointed by local 
or regional authorities.119  In New York State, local Rent Guidelines 
Boards determine rates for increases each year.120  New York City’s 
Rent Guidelines Board has nine members, all appointed by the 
Mayor.121  Two members are appointed to represent tenant interests; 
two to represent the interests of property owners; and five to 
represent the general public.122  Under the Emergency Tenant 
Protection Act of 1974, the Boards outside of New York City have 
the same composition, but members are appointed by the 
Commissioner of the State Division of Housing and Community 
Renewal.123 
Rent boards also serve functions other than determining rent 
increases.  In Newark, price increases are pegged to the consumer 
price index and cannot exceed 4%, so the Board does not set the base 
annual increase.124  Instead, its central function is to oversee 
 
 115. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.08(h)(2)(A) (1985); see also Rent Control CPI for 2019, 
OFF.  TENANT ADVOC., https://ota.dc.gov/page/rent-control-cpi-2018 
[http://perma.cc/28ZB-AUHN] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (explaining rent increases 
for rent controlled units). The consumer price index, produced by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, measures the average change in the price of a fixed bundle of goods. 
Consumer Price Index, U.S. DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. STAT, https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ 
[https://perma.cc/KGU5-7RSF] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019). 
 116. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., MUN. CODE § 17.36.020 (1997). 
 117. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-3(A) (2018). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Santa Monica serves as an example of an elected rent control board. See Meet 
the Board, CITY OF SANTA MONICA, 
https://www.smgov.net/Departments/Rent_Control/About_the_Rent_Control_Board
/Meet_the_Board.aspx [https://perma.cc/LV7K-RK5B] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019). 
 120. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-510 (2006). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Emergency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) of 1974, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 
8621 (McKinney 1987). 
 124. Rent Control, supra note 97. 
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administrative hearings and mediation of landlord-tenant disputes 
arising under Newark’s rent regulations.125 
B. Increases Beyond Annual Rate 
i. Vacancy Bonuses 
Legislators may want to allow higher rent increases when a tenant 
moves out.  Proponents argue that such “vacancy bonuses” maintain 
protections for existing tenants and prevent landlords from being 
locked into low rents when those tenants leave.126  However, 
generous vacancy allowances may also undermine the degree to 
which rent regulation can keep overall rents low.  Furthermore, 
vacancy bonuses may encourage landlords to push out existing 
tenants, so they can replace them and charge higher rents.  As noted 
earlier, two recent studies of the San Francisco housing market 
provide some evidence for this argument, finding higher rates of 
eviction and turnover in regulated units in areas with unusually high 
price appreciation.127 
Most jurisdictions allow landlords to increase rents beyond the 
annual increase when units become vacant,128 but these bonuses vary 
substantially.  In California, the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act 
allows landlords to increase rent to the market rate when a new 
tenancy begins.129  In some other jurisdictions, landlords can make 
more substantial increases upon vacancy than they are otherwise 
permitted but the vacancy bonus may not take the unit all the way up 
to the market rate.  Until June 2019, for instance, in New York City, a 
landlord could increase rent by 20% of the legal regulated rent for an 
incoming tenant with a two-year lease, or slightly less for a tenant 
with a one-year lease; recent reforms eliminated this vacancy 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Mireya Navarro, Tenant Advocates Want Rent Increases Tied to a 
Vacancy Stopped, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/18/nyregion/tenant-advocates-want-rent-increases-
tied-to-a-vacancy-stopped.html [https://perma.cc/23Bx-G4UH] (“The association said 
the vacancy allowance was written into law as a recognition that landlords might need 
to ‘catch up’ in rent revenue between tenants to help maintain the building, and as a 
way to have a new tenant bear the increase.”). 
 127. Asquith, supra note 36, at 27–30; Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 16–18. 
 128. See, e.g., Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.52 
(1996) (allowing landlords to increase rents without restriction between tenancies in 
all California cities); Vacancy Increase Reform Act of 2018, D.C. CODE § 42-3502.13 
(2018). 
 129. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1954.52–53. 
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allowance.130  D.C.’s Vacancy Increase Reform Act of 2018 instead 
pegs allowable increases to the duration of the previous tenant’s 
occupation of the unit, and permits a landlord to increase the rent by 
10% if a previous tenant occupied a unit for fewer than ten years and 
20% if the previous tenancy lasted more than ten years.131  This 
measure restrained vacancy bonuses that previously went up to 
30%.132 
Several jurisdictions impose conditions on vacancy bonuses that 
primarily concern improvements to the units in question.  In early 
2017, the Newark City Council reduced the amount that landlords 
were obligated to spend rehabilitating vacant apartments to raise 
rents by up to 20%.133  Several months later, the vacancy reforms were 
essentially reversed and the city’s rent regulation ordinance 
tightened.134  The revised ordinance requires landlords to spend an 
amount equal to four months’ rent on rehabilitating vacant 
apartments before they are eligible for vacancy bonuses of up to 10%, 
or eight months’ rent to qualify for a 20% increase.135  Jersey City 
similarly conditions a landlord’s entitlement to a vacancy increase by 
pegging the increase amount to the amount the landlord has spent on 
 
 130. “For an incoming tenant who opts for a one-year lease, the vacancy allowance 
is 20% minus the percentage difference between the Rent Guidelines Board’s 
(RGB’s) then-current guidelines for a two-year and a one-year lease.” Glossary of 
Rent Regulation Terms, NYC RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/resources/glossary-of-rent-regulation-
terms.page [https://perma.cc/R6CL-Y38G] (search for “Vacancy allowance” 
definition) (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 131. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.13 (2018). 
 132. Memorandum from Jeffrey S. DeWitt, Chief Fin. Officer, Gov’t of D.C., 
Office of the Chief Fin. Officer., to Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of D.C., 
Fiscal Impact Statement – Vacancy Increase Reform Amendment Act of 2018 1 
(Nov. 7, 2018), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/37181/B22-0025-Fiscal-Impact-
Statement1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z46W-737J]. 
 133. Tenants’ advocates decried the reform as “piece by piece deconstruction of 
rent control,” while supporters argued that the reform “strengthened protections for 
tenants against slumlords and poor maintenance on buildings.” Karen Yi, New Rule 
‘Deconstruction of Rent Control’ in Newark, Advocates Say, NJ.COM (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2017/03/newark_rent_control_ordinance.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5SQ-NKHY]. 
 134. Karen Yi, Residents Win Rent Control Battle; Landlords Face Steeper 
Hurdle to Raise Rents, NJ.COM (Sept. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nj.com/essex/2017/09/residents_win_rent_control.html 
[https://perma.cc/W6VV-SSQT]. 
 135. Id. 
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capital improvements, though it does not go as far as Newark has in 
setting a requisite spending level.136 
ii. Capital Improvement 
Another choice is the extent to which systems should compensate 
landlords for capital improvements through higher rents.  Such 
increases help incentivize property maintenance and needed repairs, 
but can allow housing to become less affordable.  Capital 
improvements may also encourage landlords to make investments 
that are not essential or desired by tenants, such as installing granite 
countertops.  Therefore, providing any kind of capital improvement 
allowance should require monitoring and enforcement. 
A landlord’s ability to pass the costs of capital improvements in 
buildings or individual units along to existing tenants, as well as the 
duration of the resulting rent increases and whether they can be 
applied retroactively, varies by jurisdiction.  Under Los Angeles’s 
Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO), landlords may pass on 
approximately 50% of the improvement costs to both individual units 
and common areas to tenants over time.137  This is done by dividing 
50% of the improvement costs over rental payments for a period not 
exceeding six years.138  By contrast, until June 2019, New York State’s 
rent regulation program allowed owners to recover 100% of their 
investments in improvements.139  New York’s rent regulation scheme 
distinguishes Major Capital Improvements (MCIs), covering building-
 
 136. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-5 (2018); NEWARK, N.J., 
ORDINANCE § 19:2-7.1 (2017). 
 137. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 151.07(A)(1)(a) (1989) (“the landlord shall only be 
entitled to a temporary monthly rent increase of 1/60th of fifty percent (50%) of the 
average per unit capital improvement cost”). The Rent Stabilization Ordinance 
defines a capital improvement as: 
The addition or replacement of the following improvements to a rental unit 
or common areas of the housing complex containing the rental unit, 
providing such new improvement has a useful life of five (5) years or more: 
roofing, carpeting, draperies, stuccoing the outside of a building, air 
conditioning, security gates, swimming pool, sauna or hot tub, fencing, 
garbage disposal, washing machine or clothes dryer, dishwasher, children’s 
play equipment permanently installed on the premises, the complete 
exterior painting of a building, and other similar improvements as 
determined by the Commission. 
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 151.02 (1989). 
 138. L.A., CAL. MUN. CODE § 151.07(A)(1)(a). 
 139. See Kevin Sun, Analysis: Here’s What the New Rent Law Will Do to the 
Average Stabilized Apartment, REAL DEAL (June 18, 2019), 
https://therealdeal.com/2019/06/18/analysis-heres-what-the-new-rent-law-will-do-to-
the-average-stabilized-apartment/ [https://perma.cc/Z4QU-X6YN]. 
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wide improvements — such as new windows, boilers, or roofs140 — 
and Individual Apartment Improvements (IAIs), covering upgrades 
to individual apartments, such as installing a new dishwasher.141 
The Office of Rent Administration in the New York State’s 
Division of Housing and Community Renewal must approve any 
requested rent increases based on MCIs.142  IAIs do not require 
DHCR approval and landlords are only required to provide 
“detailed” cost explanations.143  Rent increases based on MCIs are 
calculated by amortizing the approved costs of the improvements 
over 12.5 years for buildings with more than 35 units and over 12 
years for buildings with 6 to 35 units, subject to a 2% cap on annual 
rent increases.144  Until June 2019, the cap was 6%.145  These increases 
of 1/108th or 1/96th of the approved costs of the MCI, respectively, 
become parts of the legal base rent for 30 years.146  The cost is divided 
by the total number of rooms in the building to arrive at a per-room, 
per-month increase applied to the tenant’s rent.147  MCIs cover only 
new installations and complete replacements, not repairs of old 
equipment.148 
Pursuant to New York’s recent reforms,149 the owner of a building 
with more than 35 units can collect a permanent monthly rent 
increase equal to 1/180th of the cost of an IAI.  For owners of 
 
 140. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 2522.4(a)(2)(i) (2019). 
 141. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT 
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (2018) 
[hereinafter FACT SHEET #26 (2018)], 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orafac26.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DWT2-MV2A]. 
 142. An owner may file an application to increase the legal regulated rents of the 
building or building complex on forms prescribed by the DHCR. N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.4(a)(1) (2019). 
 143. See S.B. S6548, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). For previous system, see 
FACT SHEET #26 (2018), supra note 141, at 6. 
 144. See FACT SHEET #26 (2018), supra note 141, at 3. 
 145. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #24 MAJOR CAPITAL 
IMPROVEMENTS 3 (2014), 
https://www.msnhlaw.com/docs/fact_sheet_24_20140416125002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CGC2-QSNZ]. 
 146. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #26 GUIDE TO RENT 
INCREASES FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENTS 3 (2019), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/09/FACT20SHEET2026.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TUM9-9UW5]. 
 147. Id. 
 148. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 2522.4 (2019). 
 149. See S.B. 6458, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
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buildings with 35 or fewer units, the increase is 1/168th.150  Increases 
based on IAIs were uncapped until June 2019 and are now capped at 
$15,000.151  Landlords must provide current tenants with explanations 
of costs related to IAIs, but the process requires only that landlords 
self-certify these expenses with DHCR.  Landlords are not required 
to seek approval from new tenants for IAIs made during vacancy.152  
Before June 2019, capital improvement increases taking place upon 
vacancy were added to the legal rent after vacancy bonuses were 
calculated.153 
San Francisco permits landlords of buildings with five or fewer 
units to pass the full costs of capital improvements on to sitting and 
future tenants that have benefited from the improvements.154  This is 
subject to a 5% annual cap on any increase in base rent.155  Landlords 
of buildings with more than five units can only pass 50% of their costs, 
subject to a 10% annual cap on base rents.156  D.C. sets higher limits, 
permitting increases of up to 20% for building-wide improvements 
and up to 15% for other improvements.157 
ii. Rents Below the Legal Maximum 
Additional questions arise when a landlord charges a tenant a rent 
below the legal maximum or, in some jurisdictions, when a landlord 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.; see also Justin R. La Mort, The Theft of Affordable Housing: How Rent-
Stabilized Apartments Are Disappearing from Fraudulent Individual Apartment 
Improvements and What Can be Done to Save Them, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 351, 369–70 (2016) (arguing that IAIs should follow MCIs and be subject to 
a 6% cap). 
 152. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, OPERATIONAL BULLETIN 2016-1 
(REVISED): INDIVIDUAL APARTMENT IMPROVEMENTS 1 (2017), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/09/orao20161.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BS6E-ETKR] (outlining certification process). 
 153. See FACT SHEET #26 (2018), supra note 141, at 5. 
 154. Supervisor Ammiano Introduces Capital Improvement Passthrough 
Compromise Ord. 050702, CITY & CTY. OF S.F., https://sfrb.org/supervisor-ammiano-
introduces-capital-improvement-passthrough-compromise-ord-050702 
[https://perma.cc/G6J8-LK6S] (last visited Sept. 10, 2019). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Two exceptions are seismic work required by law and energy conservation 
work, for which landlords may pass 100% of their costs through to tenants. See Fact 
Sheet 5 - Landlord Petitions and Passthroughs, CITY & CTY. OF S.F. (Apr. 2010), 
https://sfrb.org/fact-sheet-5-landlord-petitions-and-passthroughs 
[https://perma.cc/MAP4-FKRP]. In addition, “a majority of the tenants in any unit 
may elect an alternative passthrough method based on 100% of the certified capital 
improvements costs, to be imposed at the rate of 5% of the tenant’s base rent per 
year, with the total passthrough limited to 15% of the tenant’s base rent.” Id. 
 157. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.10 (1985). 
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declines to increase a tenant’s rent by the maximum allowable 
increase.158  A landlord might do this because the market will not 
support the legal maximum rent or to keep desirable tenants in their 
buildings.  While policymakers should not discourage landlords from 
setting rents that are lower than the allowable rents, allowing them to 
bank increases creates the risk that landlords will impose banked rent 
increases suddenly, burdening tenants with large and unexpected rent 
increases.159  Some rent regulation proponents worry that landlords 
game these banked rents by charging “teaser” rents to attract tenants, 
then increasing rents sharply in order to get rid of tenants they do not 
like, or taking advantage of increases allowed upon vacancy.160 
Jurisdictions have taken different approaches to rent banking.  
Until recently, in New York City, a landlord charging a “preferential” 
rent — anything lower than the legal maximum, or the base rent plus 
all allowable increases — was able to revoke the preferential rent and 
begin charging the higher, legal regulated rent upon either lease 
renewal or vacancy.161  They were, however, required to provide 
tenants with written notice of the legal regulated rent in both the 
original and renewal leases.162  Furthermore, landlords and tenants 
 
 158. See, e.g., CITY OF WEST HOLLYWOOD RENT STABILIZATION & HOUS. DIV., 
GUIDE: RENT STABILIZATION 8 (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.weho.org/home/showdocument?id=15066 [https://perma.cc/M3MW-
QRQV]; N.Y. DIV. HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #40 PREFERENTIAL 
RENTS 1 (2019), http://www.nyshcr.org/Rent/FactSheets/orafac40.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W35M-335E]; Fact Sheet 7 - Annual Allowable Rent Increases and 
Banked Rent Increases, CITY & CTY. OF S.F. (2010), https://sfrb.org/fact-sheet-7-
annual-allowable-rent-increases-and-banked-rent-increases [https://perma.cc/CV5G-
JS7W]. 
 159. Cezary Podkul, New York Landlords Exploit Loophole to Hike Rents 
Despite Freeze, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-landlords-exploit-loophole-to-hike-
rents-despite-freeze [https://perma.cc/HSP9-AJWB]. 
 160. See, e.g., id.; Amy Plitt, How New York’s Preferential Rent Loophole Is 
Unfairly Used Against Tenants, CURBED N.Y. (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/4/25/15425058/nyc-rent-stabilization-loophole-landlords 
[https://perma.cc/XK3S-F6E4]; Steven Wishnia, ‘Preferential Rent’: How Landlords 
Kill NYC’s Affordable Apartments and Get Away With It, VILLAGE VOICE  (July 6, 
2017), https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/07/06/preferential-rent-how-landlords-kill-
nycs-affordable-apartments-and-get-away-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/H8UB-QZLJ]; 
Preferential Rents, METRO. COUNCIL ON HOUSING, 
http://metcouncilonhousing.org/help_and_answers/preferential_rents 
[https://perma.cc/E7MC-SEJE] (last visited July 25, 2019). 
 161. FACT SHEET #40, supra note 158. 
 162. Id. 
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were able to contract to apply a preferential rent for the duration of a 
tenancy.163 
In D.C., a similar system prevailed until 2018.  D.C. Attorney 
General Karl Racine challenged the practice of basing rent increases 
on legal maximum rents, rather than the preferential rents tenants 
actually pay, as a deceptive business practice.164  In 2018, the D.C. 
Housing Commission ruled in favor of the Attorney General.165  The 
Rent Charged Definition Clarification Amendment Act of 2018 
codified this decision, requiring landlords to base rent increases on 
the amount a tenant actually pays rather than the legal maximum 
rent.166 And in June 2019, the New York state legislature changed its 
system and became more like D.C.’s, making preferential rents the 
new base rents for increases during the term of a tenancy.167 
San Francisco allows landlords to apply banked rent increases to 
future years,168 while West Hollywood169 and Los Angeles explicitly 
prohibit this practice.170  East Palo Alto prohibited banking after a 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Complaint at 3–4, District of Columbia v. Equity Residential Mgmt., 2018 
D.C. Super. LEXIS 3 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2018) (Case No. 2017 CA 008334 B); Press 
Release, Office of Att’y Gen. for D.C., Attorney General Racine Files Suit Against 
Landlord for Circumventing District’s Rent Control Laws (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://oag.dc.gov/release/attorney-general-racine-files-suit-against 
[https://perma.cc/AS4K-T8AT]. 
 165. Jon Steingart, The DC Council Will Likely Pass Legislation to Fight Sharp 
Price Increases for Tenants, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://ggwash.org/view/69920/the-dc-council-will-likely-pass-rent-concession-
legislation-intended-to-end-sharp-price-increases-for-tenants 
[https://perma.cc/DK9W-K4HG]. 
 166. See id.; Jon Steingart, Legislation Intended to End Sharp Rent Increases 
Lands in the DC Council, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://ggwash.org/view/69358/legislation-intended-to-end-sharp-rent-increases-lands-
in-the-dc-council [https://perma.cc/8DWV-EU9R]; Jon Steingart, A Lawsuit Alleging 
a DC Landlord Uses Discounts to Circumvent Rent Control May Have Gotten a 
Boost, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://ggwash.org/view/66994/lawsuit-going-after-dc-landlords-offering-rent-
concessions-gets-boost [https://perma.cc/PN9A-DQXY]. 
 167. S.B. 6458, 2019 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2019) (“Any tenant who is subject to a 
lease on or after the effective date of a chapter of the laws of two thousand nineteen 
which amended this paragraph, or is or was entitled to receive a renewal or vacancy 
lease on or after such date, upon renewal of such lease, the amount of rent for such 
housing accommodation that may be charged and paid shall be no more than the rent 
charged to and paid by the tenant prior to that renewal.”). 
 168. Fact Sheet 7, supra note 158. 
 169. GUIDE: RENT STABILIZATION, supra note 158, at 8. 
 170. Nicolas Traylor, “Banking” Annual General Adjustment Rent Increases: 
Policy Considerations, CITY OF RICHMOND RENT PROGRAM 30 (Aug. 19, 2017), 
https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/43859/Item-H-2-
Presentation_8_23_17?bidId= [https://perma.cc/L3PS-FGR3]. 
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large housing provider increased its rents by 40% after several years 
of foregoing rent increases but subsequently moved to a system 
allowing banking subject to a 10% annual cap on rent increases.171  
Richmond, California similarly allows landlords to bank rent 
increases, but subjects increases to a 5% annual cap.172 
B. Hardship Increases 
Rent regulation systems generally allow a landlord to apply for a 
hardship variance if the annual increases provided do not allow the 
landlord to receive a fair income after operating expenses.  Permitting 
hardship increases thus allows jurisdictions to avoid Fifth 
Amendment takings claims that would arise from depriving landlords 
of fair rates of return.173 
 
 171. The prohibition, however, made administering the program more difficult 
because many more landlords filed for rent increases every year (knowing they would 
otherwise lose the opportunity to take them), and it became more cumbersome to 
calculate permissible rent levels and track the maximum legal rent for each tenancy.  
The city subsequently eased the prohibition, allowing banking subject to a 10% 
annual cap on rent increases.  The Los Angeles Rent Board, by contrast, decided in 
2009 to prohibit banking, citing fidelity to the goal of protecting against sudden rent 
increases.  The Board also noted that it used a simpler rent registration system — 
tracking rents only at the unit level, rather than for each new tenancy — than East 
Palo Alto that was unlikely to be similarly burdened by a banking prohibition. See 
Memorandum from Nicolas Traylor, Exec. Dir., City of Richmond Rent Program, to 
Chair Gray & Members of Rent Bd., Report on Banking of Annual General 
Adjustments and Draft Regulation 10 (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/43834/8_23_17-Item-H-
2?bidId= [https://perma.cc/38YJ-TX5R]; Memorandum from Nicolas Traylor, Exec. 
Dir., City of Richmond Rent Program, to Chair Gray & Members of Rent Bd., 
Proposed Revisions to Regulation 602, Regarding “Banking” of Annual General 
Adjustment Rent Increases (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.ci.richmond.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/47907/COMPILED-ITEM-I-
1_11-14-18 [https://perma.cc/N2F5-L3B7]; Traylor, supra note 170, at 32. 
 172. The Board considered the arguments against banking, observing that, in 
California, “most landlords are able to receive large rent increases through vacancy 
decontrol” over the long run, and suggested that a landlord who declines to take an 
annual increase is likely already receiving a fair rate of return for that year, negating 
the need to allow the landlord to take the increase later. Nevertheless, Richmond 
ultimately adopted banking, citing the likelihood that landlords will choose to raise 
rents every year if they know they will forfeit increases otherwise as well as the 
potential administrative costs of prohibiting banking. Memorandum from Nicholas 
Traylor (Nov. 14, 2018), supra note 171, at 2–3. 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person 
of . . . property, without due process of law.”); id.; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 149 (1978) (“[T]he inability of the owner to make a 
reasonable return on his property requires compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
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Jurisdictions estimate the rate of return a landlord derives on a 
given property by examining the income the landlord receives from 
that property after approved operating expenses relative to the 
property’s valuation.174  The range of what rent boards consider a fair 
return varies.  In D.C., it is 12%, while under a similar formula, New 
York considers 8.5% a fair return.175  New York also allows landlords 
to claim an alternative form of hardship if their total annual gross 
income exceeds their total annual operating expenses by less than 
5%.176  The Jersey City Rent Board considers whether a landlord will 
be unable to make mortgage payments without a hardship increase.177  
Other jurisdictions use formulas in place of fixed rates,178 which may 
offer more nuances but can make it more difficult for landlords and 
tenants to understand the hardship increase to which a landlord may 
be entitled.  Both the Newark and Hoboken Rent Boards will deny 
hardship increases if a landlord purchased a building for an inflated 
 
 174. Under New York’s rent control laws (which are stricter and cover a smaller 
share of the housing stock than rent stabilization), for example, a “fair return” 
requires a “net annual return” (income minus operating expenses) of 7.5% of the 
valuation of the property for owners outside of New York City and 8.5% for owners 
inside New York City, measured as the current valuation “properly adjusted by 
applying thereto the ratio which such assessed valuation bears to the full valuation as 
determined by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment on the basis of the 
assessment rolls of cities, towns and villages for the year 1954.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 9, § 2102.3(f)(5) (2019). 
 175. See D.C. CODE § 42-3502.12 (1985); S.B. 6458, 2019 Sen., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2019); see also Glossary of Rent Regulation Terms, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/rentguidelinesboard/resources/glossary-of-rent-regulation-
terms.page#hardship [https://perma.cc/CY7R-QE7E] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 176. N.Y. DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING AN 
OWNER’S APPLICATION FOR RENT INCREASE BASED ON ALTERNATIVE HARDSHIP 3 
(1995), 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2018/10/formrtp45iinstructionsrentincrease
alternativehardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF79-3Y6S]; see also Glossary of Rent 
Regulation Terms, supra note 175. 
 177. JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-10(a) (amended by Ordinance 
No. 19-044 2019). 
 178. See, e.g., FAIR LAWN, N.J. BOROUGH CODE § 177-11(A)(4) (1984) (“If the 
most recent year’s percentage of net operating expenses to total gross income 
exceeds the average of the prior applicable years and the most recent year’s 
percentage of net operating expenses to total gross income exceeds 60%, the 
applicant shall receive a hardship rent increase sufficient to restore the percentage of 
net operating expenses to total gross income of the most recent year to the average of 
the prior applicable years.”); id. § 177-11(C) (“The formula for figuring the hardship 
increase, if the Board has determined there is a hardship, is as follows: Net operating 
expense (4th year)/three-year average (as a decimal) = New rental to cure 
hardship.”). 
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price and thus could not reasonably have expected to receive a fair 
return on that investment.179 
Some jurisdictions condition hardship increases upon a showing 
that landlords comply with health and safety obligations.180  In Jersey 
City, a landlord must produce an inspection report showing that the 
building is in “substantial compliance” with applicable building codes 
— or submit to inspection within six months — to be eligible for a 
hardship increase.181  These processes are one way to ensure a 
balance between landlords’ entitlements to fair returns and their 
obligations to provide habitable dwellings.  But landlords whose 
buildings are losing money may lack the available cash to make 
necessary repairs, further compounding their difficulties.  Hardship 
increases may also allow jurisdictions more flexibility in responding to 
the risk that across-the-board increases will leave some landlords with 
too little revenue.  If the standards for challenges are lax, such 
challenges will add administrative costs as staff is forced to assess the 
merits of a large number of individual claims.  And of course, overly 
generous waivers will ultimately undermine the affordability 
protections provided. 
IV. FEATURES AND TRADE-OFFS OF RENT REGULATION: 
ADDITIONAL TENANT PROTECTIONS 
Rent regulation schemes are often coupled with protections for 
tenants.182  Many schemes grant tenants in regulated units special 
protections against eviction and harassment, which owners of 
regulated units might be more likely to practice because of the value 
of creating a vacancy in these units.  Such protections may also ensure 
extra security for particularly vulnerable populations. 
The trade-off here is clear.  Additional rights, such as just cause 
eviction rules or expanded access to counsel in housing court 
proceedings, can protect tenants from being harassed to leave their 
units and help prevent arbitrary or unexplained evictions.183  
 
 179. See HOBOKEN, N.J., GEN. REGS., Art. II § 155-14 (1984) (“It is not the 
intention of this chapter to permit a hardship rental increase when the landlord has 
not made a reasonably prudent investment.”). 
 180. See, e.g., JERSEY CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 260-1. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE IX § 13.76; OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. 
CODE § 8.22.360; S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE § 37.9. 
 183. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME (2009); Margaret Jane 
Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 372 (1986); Kenneth 
Salzberg & Audrey A. Zibelman, Good Cause Eviction, 21 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 61, 
62–63 (1985). See generally Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to 
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However, they can also increase landlords’ costs of removing tenants 
when warranted, ultimately raising the cost for all tenants and 
discouraging investment in rental properties.184  Further, they can 
cause landlords to conduct additional screening to minimize the risk 
of problematic tenants.185 
A. Protections Against Eviction and Harassment 
Rent regulation provisions designed to protect tenants from unjust 
evictions or landlord misconduct may take the form of just cause 
eviction statutes and other anti-harassment or anti-displacement 
protections.  Rent regulation programs may also require landlords to 
pay relocation expenses for tenants under some circumstances.186 
Just cause statutes limit the bases on which landlords may evict 
tenants to statutorily-specified grounds.187  For example, in D.C., 
Oakland, San Francisco, and throughout New Jersey,188 where just 
cause eviction protections exist, acceptable causes for eviction include 
nonpayment of rent, violation of a lease obligation, sale or conversion 
of the unit, or discontinued housing use, among others.189 
Some jurisdictions provide eviction protections to all tenants,190 
while others, like New York City and San Francisco, provide them 
 
Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 557 (1988). 
 184. See, e.g., W. DENNIS KEATING, RENT CONTROL 50 (1998) (discussing higher 
rent in return for security from eviction, so that long stay tenants benefit in time); 
Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protections and the Takings Clause, 1989 WIS. L. 
REV. 925, 959–60 (1993); J.R. Miron, Security of Tenure, Costly Tenants and Rent 
Regulation, 27 URB. STUD. 167, 168 (1990); Diamond, Economic Evidence, supra 
note 66, at 2. 
 185. Landlords screening due to difficulty of eviction is discussed in David P. Sims, 
Rent Control Rationing and Community Composition: Evidence from 
Massachusetts, 11 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 6, 24 (2011); see also Meredith 
Greif, Regulating Landlords: Unintended Consequences for Poor Tenants, 17 CITY & 
COMMUNITY 658, 666–67 (2018). 
 186. See, e.g., OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.360 (2003); S.F., CAL., 
ORDINANCE § 37.9 (2017). 
 187. “Just Cause” Eviction Policies, LOCAL HOUSING SOLUTIONS 1, 
https://www.localhousingsolutions.org/act/housing-policy-library/just-cause-eviction-
policies-overview/just-cause-eviction-policies/?pdf=2067 [https://perma.cc/K45K-
5GTV] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 188. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-53–84 (2008). 
 189. NYU  FURMAN CTR., GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE: A SURVEY OF STRATEGIES 
TO MAINTAIN NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC DIVERSITY 17 (2016), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_GentrificationResponse_26OCT20
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3E6-2SPA]. 
 190. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE IX § 13.76 (2018); OAKLAND, CAL., 
MUN. CODE § 8.22.360 (“No landlord shall endeavor to recover possession, issue a 
1072 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
only to tenants in rent-regulated units.191  At the universalist end of 
the spectrum, D.C. extends just cause eviction protections to all 
units;192 Seattle’s just cause ordinance expressly extends this 
protection even to month-to-month and verbal lease agreements;193 
and Oregon voters elected to impose just-cause eviction protections 
statewide.194 
Berkeley and Oakland also extend just cause protections to all 
units.195  A key limitation on these protections concerning rent 
regulated units in California, however, is the potential for eviction 
under the statewide Ellis Act.196  The Ellis Act allows an owner of a 
rent-regulated building to evict tenants in order to remove the 
building from the rental market.197 
Landlords seeking to evict tenants may also be required to pay 
relocation expenses to minimize the costs and disruptive effects of 
moving for tenants.  In 2018, the Oakland City Council passed the 
Uniform Relocation Ordinance, which increased the relocation 
payments landlords are required to pay tenants in rent-regulated units 
in all no-fault evictions and pegged these payments to the CPI.198  The 
Ordinance also expanded the relocation payment requirement to 
apply to owners seeking to evict tenants in order to move back into 
 
notice terminating tenancy, or recover possession of a rental unit in the city of 
Oakland unless the landlord is able to prove the existence of one of the following 
grounds.”). 
 191. See S.F., CAL., ORDINANCE § 37.9. 
 192. D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2019). 
 193. Just Cause Eviction Ordinance, SEATTLE DEP’T CONSTR. & INSPECTIONS, 
http://www.seattle.gov/sdci/codes/codes-we-enforce-(a-z)/just-cause-eviction-
ordinance [https://perma.cc/5L9M-XVMC] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). 
 194. Sasha Ingber, Oregon Set to Pass the First Statewide Rent Control Bill, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698509957/oregon-set-
to-pass-the-first-statewide-rent-control-bill [https://perma.cc/9RAF-D4BR]. 
 195. BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE IX § 13.76.030 (2018); OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. 
CODE 8.22.360 (2019) (“No landlord shall endeavor to recover possession, issue a 
notice terminating tenancy, or recover possession of a rental unit in the city of 
Oakland unless the landlord is able to prove the existence of one of the following 
grounds.”). 
 196. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12.75 (2000). 
 197. Id. 
 198. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 13468 (2017); Ali Tadayon, Oakland 
Landlords Will Have to Pay Thousands if They Evict Tenants to Move Back In, 
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/01/24/oakland-
landlords-will-have-to-pay-thousands-if-they-evict-tenants-to-move-back-in/ 
[https://perma.cc/842B-453K]. 
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their units.199  Los Angeles and San Francisco also require landlords 
to pay relocation expenses for evictions for which there is no just 
cause; New York City does not.200   
Harassment aimed at pushing tenants to vacate their units is a risk 
when market conditions and vacancy bonuses allow regulated 
landlords to collect higher rents through turnover.  A series of 
legislative efforts in 2017 expanded harassment protections for 
tenants in New York City.201  Laws prohibit landlords from harassing 
tenants by way of threats, intimidation, or tactics such as disrupting 
services or failing to complete repairs.202  These expansions also 
limited the circumstances under which landlords can communicate 
with tenants about buyouts.203 
Causes of action and remedies vary across jurisdictions.  New York 
City tenants can initiate harassment cases in housing court and can 
potentially receive civil penalties and/or compensatory damages, 
attorneys’ fees and/or punitive damages.204  San Francisco’s tenant 
harassment law generally offers the same protections as New York 
City’s, but it does not similarly limit landlords’ abilities to contact 
tenants about buyouts.205  In San Francisco, a tenant who successfully 
sues for harassment can collect the greater of treble damages or $1000 
for each offense under local law,206 and $2000 in statutory damages 
for each threat of harassment under state law.207  In harassment cases, 
both the Rent Board and the City Attorney can pursue civil litigation 
against landlords for civil penalties and injunctive relief or to refer 
cases to the District Attorney.208 
New York City also designates “anti-harassment zones,”209 in 
which an owner seeking a permit for construction or renovation must 
 
 199. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 8.22.850, 8.22.300–.390; Barbara J. Parker, 
Frequently Asked Questions, IV.1., OFF. CITY ATT’Y (Mar. 6, 2018), https://cao-
94612.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/OAK071011.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3B2-9AJZ]. 
 200. L.A., CAL. MUN. CODE § 151.30 (2007); S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 37.9C 
(2017). 
 201. Protecting Tenants, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/reports/speakers-
2017-annual-report/protecting-tenants/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 27-2115(o) (2017). 
 205. See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 37.10B (2017). 
 206. Id. § 37.10B(c). 
 207. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.2(b) (2018). 
 208. Any person, including the City, may enforce the provisions of this Section by 
means of a civil action. Id. § 37.11A (2017). 
 209. Certification of No Harassment, N.Y.C. DEP’T HOUSING PRESERVATION & 
DEV., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/owners/certification-of-no-harassment.page 
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first obtain a “certification of no harassment,” or a waiver, by 
submitting documentation about the owners or members of a 
corporate entity, and any rental history to the city’s Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development.210  The city then commences 
a period of notice, outreach, and investigation into any past 
harassment, including soliciting feedback from tenants and 
community groups.211  If the investigation reveals allegations of 
harassment, an administrative body reviews the case to determine 
whether the agency can refuse to grant a certificate.212 
In Oakland, enforcement power is vested in the City Attorney to 
pursue actions against landlords displaying a pattern or practice of 
harassment, rather than relying on individual tenants to raise these 
claims.213  This system provides the advantage of lowering the burden 
on tenants and also makes it easier for the City Attorney to identify 
patterns of harassment.214  East Palo Alto and West Hollywood have 
protection against harassment, but do not provide for treble damages 
or attorneys’ fees.215 
B. Special Provisions for Particular Tenants 
Even if policymakers choose not to provide additional protections 
to all rent regulated tenants, they may decide to offer them to 
vulnerable groups, such as seniors, people with disabilities, or low-
income households with children.  Often these protections involve 
subsidies that cover rent increases for such tenants, essentially 
limiting the tenants’ contributions to rent.216  The argument for such 
protections is that these vulnerable populations are often on fixed 
incomes and have limited or no ability to increase earnings in order to 
handle higher rents.  Furthermore, these subsidies can shift the cost of 
 
[https://perma.cc/G5T5-SMMA] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019). The Certification of No 
Harassment requirements apply to five geographic areas and to all single room 
occupancy multiple dwellings (SROs). Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See GENTRIFICATION RESPONSE, supra note 189, at 19. 
 213. OAKLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.22.150(c) (2019). 
 214. See id. 
 215. Tenant Harassment Prohibition, CITY OF WEST HOLLYWOOD, 
https://www.weho.org/city-government/rent-stabilization-housing/rent-
stabilization/tenant-faqs/tenant-harassment-prohibition [https://perma.cc/CB9D-
SURR] (last visited Oct. 2, 2019); EAST PALO ALTO, CAL., ORDINANCE §§ 14.02.100, 
14.02.170(B) (2019). 
 216. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24 (1985); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-509 
(repealed 2019). 
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alleviating rent burdens from landlords to the government.  However, 
these subsidies involve taxpayer dollars and can be costly to 
administer and enforce.  Policymakers should also consider the 
potential risk of moral hazard if it is possible for tenants to change 
their reported income, household composition, or some other 
malleable attribute in order to qualify for benefits.  Landlords may 
also be subject to moral hazard, raising rents on tenants beyond what 
they would otherwise have asked, because the government, not the 
tenant, is paying for the increase. 
Many jurisdictions provide no such protections, although they may 
provide these groups with benefits outside of rent regulation 
programs.  Both New York and D.C. extend additional protections 
from rent increases to tenants of rent-regulated apartments who are 
elderly or have disabilities.217  In both cities, tenants must register in 
order to receive these subsidies.218  New York City’s Senior Citizen 
Rent Increase Exemption (SCRIE) and the Disabled Rent Increase 
Exemption (DRIE)219 freeze rents at their current level for tenants 
with combined household incomes of $50,000 or less who pay one-
third or more of their monthly household income in rent.220  Going 
forward, a property tax credit to the landlord will cover the difference 
between the legal rent and the frozen rate the tenant pays.221  Tenants 
are responsible for applying to the program and periodically 
reestablishing their eligibility.222  Public awareness and uptake have 
been low since the program’s inception,223 prompting the city to 
 
 217. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-509 (repealed 2019). 
 218. See Freeze Your Rent: A Guide for Tenants, N.Y.C. DEP’T  FIN. 1, 9–10 (Nov. 
1, 2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/brochures/scriedriebrochure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5SEX-ZTKH]; Elderly and Disability Tenant Rent Control 
Registration Clinic, D.C. OFFICE OF THE TENANT ADVOCATE, 
https://ota.dc.gov/page/elderly-and-disability-tenant-rent-control-registration-clinic 
[https://perma.cc/M8HQ-HUFQ] (last visited July 20, 2019). 
 219. Rent Freeze for People with Disabilities: Disability Rent Increase Exemption 
(DRIE) Program, N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN. & N.Y.C. HOUSING PRESERVATION & DEV., 
https://access.nyc.gov/programs/disability-rent-increase-exemption-drie/ 
[https://perma.cc/E2WU-ZZNV] (last visited July 18, 2019). 
 220. Freeze Your Rent, supra note 218, at 2.  
 221. Id. at 14. 
 222. Id. at 15. 
 223. See Erica Byfield, NYC Program Helps Seniors Freeze Their Rent, But ‘Tens 
of Thousands’ Don’t Know About It, NBC N.Y. (July 14, 2017, 10:32 PM), 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYC-Program-Helps-Seniors-Freeze-Their-
Rent-But-Many-Dont-Know-About-It-Thousands-Dont-Know-About-This-NYC-
Rent-Freezing-Program-434590073.html [https://perma.cc/E8F6-33ZE]. New York 
City Councilmember Helen Rosenthal’s office has been trying to raise awareness of 
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engage in public outreach to make potential applicants aware of their 
eligibility.224  In D.C., the Elderly Tenant and Tenant With a 
Disability Protection Amendment Act of 2016 caps annual rent 
increases for eligible tenants at the lowest of the Social Security Cost-
of-Living Adjustment, the CPI, or 5% of the rent the tenant currently 
pays.225 
New York’s SCRIE and DRIE programs fix rents at lower levels 
while keeping the amount of rent the landlord receives the same.226  
As a result, these programs are also relatively costly to the city 
government, which makes up the difference between the frozen rent 
and the legal maximum rent.227  Under D.C.’s scheme, landlords must 
absorb the difference between the 5% cap on rent increases for 
tenants who are elderly or have disabilities and 10% cap for all other 
tenants.228  But landlords receive property tax credits for the costs of 
capital improvements to properties housing elderly or disabled 
tenants.229  Thus both systems contain at least some provisions to 
encourage landlords to continue to accept elderly and disabled 
tenants even though they may pay lower out-of-pocket rents. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
In a policymaker’s ideal world, research would show the effect of 
each of the various decisions that have to be made in designing a rent 
regulation program.  Presently, however, there is little rigorous 
 
SCRIE and locate more seniors to apply. Id. So far, they have signed up about 1400 
people. Id.  “Reimbursement is not the issue. Money from the city isn’t the issue,” 
Rosenthal said. “The issue is tens of thousands of people qualify for the program but 
don’t know about it.” Id. A similar rent freeze program, DRIE, is targeted toward 
people with disabilities.  Both programs require residents to reapply each year to 
ensure they don’t earn more than $50,000 per year. Id.; Mireya Navarro, Albany 
Expands Effort to Cap Regulated Rents for Older Tenants, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/nyregion/albany-expands-effort-to-cap-
regulated-rents-for-older-tenants.html [https://perma.cc/75VX-YUG6]. 
 224. Sarina Trangle, City Goes Door-To-Door in Effort to Enroll More Senior 
Citizens in Rent Freeze Program, AM N.Y. (July 9, 2017), 
https://www.amny.com/real-estate/city-goes-door-to-door-in-effort-to-enroll-more-
senior-citizens-in-rent-freeze-program-1.13790667 [https://perma.cc/2CF8-BUPE] 
(“At that time, the city estimated that 69,000 eligible households were not benefitting 
from SCRIE and nearly 25,000 qualified families were not receiving DRIE.”). 
 225. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24 (1985). 
 226. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-509 (repealed 2019). 
 227. Id. 
 228. D.C. CODE § 42-3502.24. 
 229. Id. 
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research about modern-day rent regulation programs 230  and even 
less about which particular features drive the effects rent regulation 
may have upon the housing market.  Without changes in policies that 
allow researchers to isolate the effects of various features, it will be 
difficult to specify what kinds of reforms might lead to more effective 
and efficient policies.  But some jurisdictions are considering changes 
in particular elements of their rent regulation programs,231 and 
research should follow those reforms carefully.  Further, this Article 
focused on programs in the United States, but it would also be helpful 
to survey the design of programs around the world and better 
understand what research shows about those programs and how those 
lessons might apply in the United States. 
Jurisdictions considering new rent regulation programs, as well as 
those thinking about how to reform existing systems, should think 
carefully about the range of options available.  These jurisdictions 
should talk with people familiar with various jurisdictions’ programs 
to learn more about the implications and unintended consequences of 
various design elements.  Jurisdictions also should consider how their 
rental markets are changing and whether their rent regulation 
programs are keeping up.  As more single-family homes are rented, 
for example, and more of those are owned by companies that manage 
 
 230. Of the reviewed studies, most use data from the 1990s. See Autor et al., supra 
note 17, at 32; Diamond et al., supra note 16, at 6; Gilderbloom & Yee, supra note 15, 
at 219. Only the few studies which consider changes in regulations in San Francisco 
and Massachusetts use data up to 2000, one study goes up to 2005; only Asquith, 
supra note 36, uses data solely from after 2000. 
 231. For examples of proposed legislation currently under consideration in state 
legislatures, see, for example, A.B. 1482, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) 
(amending Costa-Hawkins Act to allow rent stabilization for certain single-family 
homes); A.B. 1110, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (extending notice period 
required for month-to-month leases based on amount of proposed rent increase); 
A.B. 724, 2019–20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (creating online rental registry); S.B. 
19-225, 72d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019); H.B. 0255, 101st Gen. 
Assemb. (Ill. 2019) (repealing statewide ban on rent regulation); H.B. 2192, 101st 
Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019) (establishing statewide rent regulation program); H.B. 1316, 
191st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019) (allowing jurisdictions to impose local 
limits on rent increases); S.B. 5040, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (allowing additional New 
York State jurisdictions to enact rent regulation laws); S.B. 2591A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 
2019) (amending rent stabilization high-rent deregulation provisions); S.B. 2845, Reg. 
Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (prohibiting landlords from revoking preferential rents upon lease 
termination); S.B. 185, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (eliminating 20& vacancy bonus for 
rent stabilized units); N.Y. S.B. 3693/A.B. 6322 (N.Y. 2019) (eliminating permanent 
increases for major capital improvements); S.B. 3770, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) 
(repealing provisions of rent stabilization law relating to individual apartment 
improvement increase); S.B. 299A, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (limiting scope of fuel 
pass-along charges for rent-stabilized units); S.B. 5600, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2019) (increasing notice period for termination of residential leases). 
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hundreds or thousands of units, the exemption for single-family 
rentals may no longer be warranted in some cities.232  Similarly, as 
more tenants use home-sharing platforms to sublet their units for 
short-term visitors,233 the interaction of rent regulation and home-
sharing regulations may require attention.  More jurisdictions are 
funding legal assistance for renters facing eviction, and that change 
may require rethinking some aspects of rent regulation programs.234 
Given the crisis in housing affordability that almost every major 
metropolitan area faces,235 the pressure to regulate rents will likely 
increase in the coming years.  Further, residents are likely to call for 
rent regulation to counter their concerns about the effects new 
investments in neighborhoods may have in increasing rents or 
prompting displacement.236  Policymakers and researchers should 
 
 232. See CAROLINA K. REID ET AL., TERNER CTR., THE RISE OF SINGLE-FAMILY 
RENTALS AFTER THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS: UNDERSTANDING TENANT PERSPECTIVES 
1–2, 16 (2018) http://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/uploads/Single-
Family_Renters_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC2K-NYSD]. See generally James 
Mills et al., Large-Scale Buy-to-Rent Investors in the Single-Family Housing Market: 
The Emergence of a New Asset Class, 47 REAL ESTATE ECON. 399 (2019) (exploring 
potential factors behind the rise of investor-owned single-family rental housing). 
 233. See generally DAVID WACHSMUTH ET AL., URB. POLITICS & GOVERNANCE 
RESEARCH GRP., MCGILL UNIV. SCH. OF URBAN PLANNING, THE HIGH COST OF 
SHORT-TERM RENTALS IN NEW YORK CITY (2018); Alastair Boone, What Airbnb 
Did to New York City, CITYLAB (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/what-airbnb-did-to-new-york-city/552749/ 
[https://perma.cc/F6JM-WWMG]. 
 234. Soni Sangha, Eviction on Trial: Cities from New York to Minneapolis are 
Providing Free Attorneys to Low-Income Tenants Facing Eviction, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-01-
22/cities-provide-lawyers-to-tenants-facing-eviction [https://perma.cc/KE29-Z6NX]. 
 235. “Every major metropolitan area in the U.S. has a shortage of affordable and 
available rental homes for extremely low-income renters.”, NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 8 (2019), 
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7XYK-AGYU]. The same is true for every state. Id. at 1. In large 
metropolitan areas, the shortage severity ranges from 13 affordable and available 
rental homes to 51 for every 100 extremely low-income rent households. Id. at 8. In 
states, the range is from 19/100 to 66/100. Id. at 1. There are more than 18 million rent 
burdened households across the country of which nearly 10.7 million are severely 
rent burdened. Id. at 5. “[R]enters with incomes below eighty percent of AMI 
account for ninety-two percent of all cost-burdened renters.” Id. 
 236. Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 242–45 (2017); 
John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 107–08 
(2014). See generally Michael Hankinson, When Do Renters Behave Like 
Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and Nimbyism, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473, 
484 (2018) (arguing that development “presents a downside risk” to renters in the 
form of the risk of displacement). 
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focus on analyzing how best to design and test modern rent regulation 
systems that enhance stability for current tenants while minimizing 
adverse effects on investment in both new and existing rental housing. 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to current debates that have largely left the particulars 
of rent regulation unexamined, this Article centers on the details of 
rent regulation ordinances, showing how different jurisdictions have 
balanced the trade-offs inherent in rent regulation.  This balancing 
can be seen at all phases of rent regulation, from program design to 
enforcement.  Jurisdictions must decide how broadly to regulate; how 
deregulation will occur; what kinds of costs and inflation will be 
reflected in rent increases; and how to respond to both landlord and 
tenant concerns. Jurisdictions must also decide the degree to which 
rent regulation should be paired with other tenant protections — such 
as harassment and eviction protections — that can potentially 
increase tenant stability but make regulation more costly and less 
flexible for landlords. Future research will hopefully help 
practitioners, advocates, and policymakers better understand the 
magnitude of these trade-offs in different market settings and guide 
them towards more informed policy choices. 
